Ninewa council votes against PMU participation in retaking Mosul

But was the vote really necessary? I feel that there must be better things that the Ninewa council could spend their time doing. After Tikrit and, more importantly, after Ramadi, it's become rather obvious that the Hashd role in the fight for Mosul cannot/will not go beyond establishing perimeter and/or shaping operations. In my view messages like this vote seem unnecessary, divisive (as indicated by the PUK, Shiite and Turkmen representatives reported opposition to the vote) and therefore possibly harmful.

Abadi's cabinet reshuffle plan heats up competition among Shia parties

PM Abadi's plan to inject fresh blood into his cabinet is polarizing the Shia coalition. Sadr supports Abadi's plan while State of Law and ISCI seem more interested in replacing Abadi himself. Sadr is trying to position himself to increase his influence in the government. He's telling Abadi: I'll support you and your plan, but in return I get to pick the committee that gets to nominate the  new cabinet members. ISCI and State of Law are unhappy.

So the choice may end up being one between the current dysfunction and a Sadr-dominated cabinet, with probably greater dysfunction....Unless, Abadi manages to pacify ISCI and State of Law, while keeping Sadr's hand out of the cookie jar. That's a tall order.

Are Abadi and the KRG serious about a new oil deal?

So the Baghdad and Erbil governments are now negotiating, very publicly, a new arrangement to settle, at least temporarily, their differences over KRG oil exports and budget.

PM Abadi made an offer, which the KRG says it accepts. But does this mean a deal is happening? It's not that simple.

Abadi's proposal was this: "I have a suggestion: Give us the oil and we will give every Kurdish employee a salary like we do for every Iraqi employee."


The KRG interpreted the proposal as: "sending the entire salaries of the Kurdistan Region’s 1.4 million employees which amount to 890 billion IQD."

The problem is, 890 billion IQD is about $800 million, but the 600,000 bpd the KRG would hand over to State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) are worth about $450 million (assuming $25/bbl). 

Is Baghdad ready to cover the difference of $350 million? Most certainly not.

The way I see it, Abadi's "like we do for every Iraqi employee," was meant to include implied austerity measures that are bound to increase as Iraq's budget deficit grows bigger and bigger.

Federal Oil Ministry includes KRG exports in January figures

Something is different. The Federal Oil Ministry today included oil produced and exported by the KRG via Ceyhan in it's production and export figures for January. The addition brought the total production figure to a nice and juicy 4,775,000 bpd! This was not the case in previous statements since the collapse of the last oil/budget agreement. Last month's statement, for example, stated that: "Oil exports via Ceyhan port are suspended because the agreed amounts have not been delivered by the Kurdistan Region Government"

Could this mean that a new deal has been struck? Or is Baghdad just messing with Erbil?

Fayadh and Ghabban under fire

The parliament defense and security committee--whose members are often associated with nonsense statements--seems to be making some sense this week. The committee members met with PM Abadi yesterday and pushed him to replace Hashd Sha'bi (aka PMU) administrator Falih Fayadh with a military officer because he's been unable to discipline some of the Hashd groups.

The committee was also quite upset with Interior Minister Mohammed Ghabban and his recent appointment of supposedly hundreds of fellow Badr organization members.

Obviously the members of the committee are all motivated by their personal and partisan interests first, but if Ghadban is on the road to becoming Solagh 2.0 and populate the ministry with death squads then I sure am glad that someone is trying to prevent it.

Is Kirkuk that cheap?

Kirkuk, which has been desperate for cash for so long, has finally received what seems to be a first tranche of petrodollars from the KRG. Kirkuk's oilfields (namely Avana and Bai Hassan) have been contributing roughly half of the oil the KRG has been exporting independently since the collapse of the oil/budget deal with Baghdad last summer.

Obviously there's a lot more to the ties between the KRG and Kirkuk than just cash, but my first reaction is:

1) Kirkuk is massively underselling itself!

2) Did Baghdad really fail to make a more appealing bid?

3) Or is it that Baghdad didn't want to throw good money after bad? (Not that Baghdad had invested much in Kirkuk between 2003 and 2014)

4) If # 3 is the case, then perhaps Kirkuk felt it had no choice but to accept whatever the KRG was willing to offer, which is next to nothing. A mere $10 million for 200,000 or 250,000 bpd is insane.

5) If #3 and #4 reflect what actually happened, then Kirkuk must be resenting the deal already and will be/is searching for a better one.

What's speaker Jubouri doing in DC?

Curiosity is mounting in Baghdad. The Speaker of Parliament, Saleem al-Jubouri, has reportedly (according to Iraqiya TV) been in Washington DC since last Wednesday but he's yet to make any public statements/appearances. I heard that he's doing this trip not in an official capacity as Speaker, but in a personal one as a Sunni leader. Still, this doesn't explain why he hasn't done any speaking engagements at the usual think tanks. Strange.

Rumor has it that Jubouri wants to talk to US officials about Sunni politics but is so fearful of Iran's watchful eyes in Baghdad that he decided to come all the way to DC. Questions about this trip will likely start to haunt him soon. Will be interesting to see who in Baghdad will rise to defend him. 

The problem with Erdogan's exclusionary policy against Syrian Kurds

The Syria peace talks are stumbling on the 2nd day, which is not unexpected. It seems that despite the devastation, important regional actors (namely Saudi Arabia and Turkey) and in turn their proxies are willing to drag their feet. John Kerry is rightfully pissed.

While the Saudis are showing a little bit of flexibility now, I think the Turks are shooting themselves in the foot by insisting on keeping the most important Syrian Kurdish factions out of the discussion. The US and UN should not have acquiesced to Turkey's demand.

Erdogan thinks that by denying the PYD/YPG a seat at the table their role will diminish and that, in turn, hurts the PKK. But the argument could also be made that by telling the Syrian Kurds that they have no place in future Syria, Erdogan increases the risk of Syria's disintegration and the emergence/consolidation of Syrian Kurdish autonomy.